Abstract-We introduce a scheme for Provable Data Possession (PDP) that allows a client which has stored data at an untrusted server to verify that the server possesses the original data that it stored without retrieving it. This work is the first attempt to build a PDP scheme using the concept of sigma protocols. The client maintains a constant amount of data to verify the proof. The challenge-response protocol that is derived from the sigma protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data. This minimizes network communication. We present a provably-secure Sigma-PDP scheme that is more efficient than previous solutions in terms of both computation and communication complexity because of a major reduction in the number of exponentiations involved in the proof of possession. In addition to minimizing computation at the server we reduce client computation. We eliminate any exponentiation at the server while the previous solutions have a fixed set of at least c exponentiations to generate the proof, where c is a constant that is approximately equal to 500. We limit the exponentiations at the client to 5, irrespective of the challenge size while the previous solution needs at least c exponentiations in order to check the validity of the proof.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing has been gaining significant momentum in recent years. As suggested by [6] , cloud computing frees organizations from the need to buy and maintain their own hardware and software infrastructure.
In cloud storage systems, the server that stores the client's data is not necessarily trusted. Users might want to check if their data has been tampered with or deleted. However, as in [3] outsourcing the storage of very large ¿les to a remote server presents an additional constraint: the client should not download all stored data in order to verify it since the bandwidth and time available may be prohibitive, especially if the client performs this check frequently.
Ateniese ‫ݐ݁‬ ݈ܽ . [2] have formalized a model called provable data possession (PDP). In this model, data (often represented as a ¿le ‫)ܨ‬ is preprocessed by the client, and metadata used for veri¿cation purposes is produced. The ¿le and metadata are then sent to an untrusted server for storage, and the client may delete the local copy of the ¿le. The client keeps some information (possibly secret) to check server's responses later. The server proves that the data has not been tampered with by responding to challenges sent by the client. The authors of [2] propose several variations of their scheme under different cryptographic assumptions. These schemes provide probabilistic guarantees of possession, where the client checks a random subset of stored blocks with each challenge that it generates.
PDP and related schemes ( [2] , [4] , [5] ) apply to the case of static, archival storage, i.e., a file that is outsourced and never changes. Pietro ‫ݐ݁‬ ݈ܽ . [8] present a scheme with limited dynamism. Reference [3] extends the PDP model to support provable updates on the stored data, where the client updates the outsourced data-by inserting, modifying, or deleting stored blocks or files-while maintaining data possession guarantees. In this paper, we present an archival network storage solution. Given that the file is large and is stored at a remote site, accessing the entire file is expensive. Therefore, to increase scalability and limit bandwidth, we define a -protocol model for provable data possession (PDP) that allows the client to be able to verify that a server has stored a file without retrieving the data from the server and without having to access the entire file. This allows the server to access small portions of the file in generating a proof. We give the provably-secure scheme for PDP using -protocols. The client stores a small amount of data (public and secret key) to verify the server's proof. The scheme uses ܱሺͳሻ bandwidth. Each challenge requires small, constant amount of communication between client ‫ܥ‬ and server ܵ. In order to generate the proof, the server accesses ܿ blocks where ܿ is a small constant ܿ ൎ ͶͲ if file size is ݊ ൌ ͳǡͲͲͲǡͲͲͲ blocks. In terms of computation, we have exponentiations, multiplications and additions involved in the proof of possession. Since the size of the file is ݊, the storage at the server is ܱሺ݊ሻ. The client computes one-time signatures on each file block and then stores the file along with the corresponding signatures with the server. At a later time, the client can verify if the server possesses the file by sending a random challenge against a randomly selected set of file blocks. Using the queried blocks and their corresponding signatures, the server generates a proof of possession. The proof of possession is a linear combination of a constant number ܿ of file blocks and an aggregation of their corresponding signatures. The client checks the validity of the proof with the help of secret data that it stored and is thus convinced of data possession, without actually having to retrieve the file blocks. The proof of security is based on the discrete logarithm assumption.
The proposed scheme can be easily understood by first considering -protocols. A -protocol is a three-move protocol between a prover and a verifier. The prover proves to the verifier that it knows a witness to a common input without revealing the witness. This is called zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. One-time signatures are generated based on this simple protocol using the Okamoto protocol, an example of a -protocol. The signing key in the one-time signature scheme is ሺሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻ, where ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ is the witness in the Okamoto protocol and ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻ is randomly chosen each time a new message has to be signed. Therefore, a new signing key is used to sign every new message, making the use of one-time signatures possible. The prover also computes the public key for each message block ݉ which when given to the verifier along with the signature gives provision to check the validity of the signature. The client acts as the prover and the server behaves as the verifier of the signatures that the client generates.
A random challenge ݁ ൌ ሺሺ݅ ଵ ǡ ݅ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݅ ሻǡ ሺܾ ଵ ǡ ܾ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܾ ሻሻ for ͳ ܿ ݊, chosen by the client contains indicesሺ݅Ԣ‫ݏ‬ሻ and co-efficientsሺܾԢ‫ݏ‬ሻ. To generate a proof of possession for this challenge, the server has to possess the blocks indicated by the indices to multiply them with the corresponding coefficients and send across a small amount of data to the client for verification. The client has the private keys to verify this proof. Therefore, the client is convinced of data possession, without actually having to retrieve the file blocks hence minimizing bandwidth. In the ‫̶݂ݎܲ݊݁ܩ‪ǲ‬‬ and ‫‪݂ǳ‬ݎ݄ܲ݇ܿ݁ܥ‪ǲ‬‬ phases, the server acts as prover and the client behaves as verifier.
We do not address public verifiability in this paper and hence limit the validation of proof to the client. We prove the security of our constructions using standard assumptions.
The main advantage of our method is a reduction in computational complexity compared to [2] at the client and server. The PDP scheme of [2] involves larger number of exponentiations involved in generating the proof of possession. Exponentiations can be expensive and we eliminate any such computation at the server. We also fix the number of exponentiations to 5 at the client making it independent of the size of the challenge. Thus the proposed scheme is more efficient. Even though the scheme in [2] and our method have a computational complexity of ܱሺͳሻ, our method has a major reduction in the number of exponentiations.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we overview related work. In Section III, we describe provable data possession. We also introduceprotocols and its properties, followed by the definition of the Okamoto protocol that provides basis for the proposed scheme. We later give a one-time signature scheme based on the Okamoto protocol. In Section IV, we give the definitions for -PDP schemes followed by our construction (-PDP). We give the details of the complexity of the scheme in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Ateniese et al. [2] were the first to have formalized the provable data possession (PDP) model. The authors present several variations of their scheme under different cryptographic assumptions. These schemes provide probabilistic guarantees of possession, where the client checks a random subset of stored blocks with each challenge. We refer to [2] for a detailed review on earlier relevant works.
The PDP scheme in [2] provides an optimal protocol for the static case. Reference [3] is an improved scheme of the original PDP in that the client asks the server to prove that the stored data has not been tampered with or deleted. In this paper, they propose constructions for dynamic provable data possession, which extends the PDP model to support provable updates on the stored data. Pietro ‫ݐ݁‬ ݈ܽ. [8] gave another dynamic PDP solution called Scalable PDP. This PDP technique is based on symmetric key cryptography (without requiring any bulk encryption), it also supports operations such as modification, deletion and append. This is known to be a very efficient PDP scheme for operations that are only append-like. Reference [9] uses the PDP framework for remote data checking based on spot checking where in corruption of any fraction of the data stored at the server can be detected by the client. They integrate forward errorcorrecting codes into PDP. Reference [10] gives a PDP scheme in hybrid clouds that supports dynamic scalability in which they consider multiple cloud service providers to cooperatively store and maintain the client's data. Another extension of the original PDP is presented in [12] . They proposed a generic transformation that meets the speci¿ed requirements and that encodes a ¿le using forward error correcting codes in order to add robustness to any Remote Data Checking (RDC) scheme based on spot checking. Our scheme has static properties and hence follows the original PDP presented in [2] . Many other variations of PDP schemes have been proposed in the past. The techniques have been based on various concepts to verify the possession of data that a remote server stores.
Our PDP solution is the first attempt to build a PDP scheme that uses the concepts of -protocols. The security of the proof of possession of data on a server is proved using the properties of sigma protocols. Reference [2] uses various assumptions to guarantee data possession of their scheme in the random oracle model. Our scheme uses the DL assumption to prove security. Reference [2] offers unlimited verifications which we achieve but we do not address public verifiability that is given in [2] . Compared to the PDP scheme in [2] , our scheme is more efficient in both setup and verification phases because it depends on lesser number of modular exponentiations, multiplications and additions.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we explain -protocols and its properties for easy understanding of the proposed scheme. We first define -protocols and further introduce the important concepts of knowledge soundness, witness indistinguishability and witness hiding properties of -protocols. We also describe the Okamoto protocol. We later build a one-time signature scheme based on the Okamoto protocol.
A. Provable Data Possession (PDP)
Reference [2] gives a framework for provable data possession. A PDP protocol checks that an outsourced storage site retains a file ‫,ܨ‬ which is a collection of ݊ blocks. The client ‫ܥ‬ (data owner) pre-processes the file, generating a small amount of data that is stored locally, transmits the file along with the metadata to the server ܵ, and may delete its local copy. The server stores the file. At a later time, the client issues a challenge to the server to check if the server has retained the file. The client requests that the server compute a function of the stored file and metadata, which it sends back to the client. Using its locally stored data, the client verifies the response.
B. -protocols [1] Let ܴ be a binary relation, i.e., ܴ is a subset of ሼͲǡͳሽ ‫כ‬ ൈ ሼͲǡͳሽ ‫כ‬ , with the restriction that if ሺ‫,ݔ‬ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ, then the length of ‫ݓ‬ is at most ‫‬ ሺȁ‫ݔ‬ȁሻ for some polynomial ‫‬ ሺǤ ሻ and ‫|ݔ|‬ is the length of ‫.ݔ‬ For some ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ, we may think of x as an instance of some computational problem, and ‫ݓ‬ as the solution to the instance. We call ‫ݓ‬ a witness for ‫ݔ‬ . We define ‫ܮ‬ ோ to be the set of inputs ‫ݔ‬ for which there exists a ‫ݓ‬ such that ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ.
-protocols ( [7] , [1] ) are three-move protocols between a prover, P and verifier, V in which P and V have a common input ‫ݔ‬ and P has a private input ‫ݓ‬ such that ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ. P tries to prove to V that either ‫ݔ‬ belongs to language ‫ܮ‬ ோ or it knows a witness ‫ݓ‬ such that ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ . The protocol pattern is given below. PROTOCOL 3.1. -protocol template for a relation ܴ:
• Common Input: P and V get ‫.ݔ‬ • Private Input: P has a value ‫ݓ‬ such that ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ.
• The protocol:
1. P sends V a message ܽ, Let ‫ݎ‬ be the randomness used to generate ܽ. 2. V sends a random ‫-ݐ‬bit challenge ݁ to P. 3. P sends a reply ‫,ݖ‬ and V decides to accept or reject based on the data he has seen, i.e. (‫ݔ‬ǡ ܽǡ ݁ǡ ‫.)ݖ‬ We will assume throughout that both P, V are probabilistic polynomial time machines, so P's only advantage over V is that he knows ‫.ݓ‬ If V accepts then it is convinced that P knows a witness ‫ݓ‬ such that ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ. Moreover, if V is honest it does not learn any more information than ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ . This implies that theprotocol is honest-verifier zero-knowledge. Note that the relation ܴ is such that it is hard to compute ‫ݓ‬ from ‫ݔ‬ , otherwise V could compute ‫ݓ‬ by itself and it does not need to be convinced that P knows ‫.ݓ‬ We now define -protocols formally. DEFINITION 3.2 [1] . A protocol P is said to be a -protocol for relation ܴ if:
• P is of the above 3-move form, and we have completeness: if P, V follow the protocol on the input ‫ݔ‬ and private input ‫ݓ‬ to P where ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ, the verifier always accepts.
• From any x and any pair of accepting conversations on input ‫ݔ‬ǡ ሺܽǡ ݁ǡ ‫ݖ‬ሻǡ ሺܽǡ ݁Ԣǡ ‫ݖ‬ǯሻ where ݁ ് ݁Ԣ , one can efficiently compute ‫ݓ‬ such that ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ . This is called the soundness property.
• Define ோ to be the set of ‫'ݔ‬s for which there exists ‫ݓ‬ such that ሺ‫ݔ‬ǡ ‫ݓ‬ሻ ‫א‬ ܴ . There exists a polynomial-time simulator M, which on input ‫ݔ‬ ‫א‬ ோ and a random ݁ outputs an accepting conversation of the form ሺܽǡ ݁ǡ ‫ݖ‬ሻ, with the same probability distribution as conversations between the honest P, V on input ‫ݔ‬ . This is called special honest-verifier zero-knowledge. Reference [7] shows that a sigma-protocol can be converted to zero-knowledge proofs or zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge using commitment schemes. In this paper, we use -protocols that are witness indistinguishable and witness hiding to construct an efficient one-time signature scheme [1] given in Section III-D.
C. Okamoto Protocol
We consider an example one-time signature scheme that is based on the Okamoto protocol, an example -protocol. Let ‫ܩ‬ be a group of prime order ‫,ݍ‬ with generators ݃ ଵ and ݃ ଶ , set in such a way that no one can efficiently compute, ‫,ݔ‬ such that ݃ ଵ ൌ ݃ ଶ ௫ . The Okamoto protocol is a -protocol based on the relation
The Okamoto protocol proceeds as follows: PROTOCOL 3.3. The Okamoto Protocol:
• Private Input: P chooses a value ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ such that ሺ݄ǡ ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻሻ ‫א‬ ܴ.
The properties of witness-indistinguishability and witness-hiding also hold for Okamoto protocols. They are defined as follows: DEFINTION 3.4 [11] . Perfect witness-indistinguishable ሺWIሻ: No matter how ݁ is chosen by the verifier, all possible pairs ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ consistent with ݄ (i.e., satisfying ݃ ଵ ௭ భ ݃ ଶ ௭ మ ൌ ݄ܽ ) are equally likely from the point of view of the verifier.
DEFINITION 3.5 [11] . Witness hiding (WH): Even a malicious verifier cannot, by talking to the prover, learn the underlying witnesses.
D. One-time signature scheme
We now build a one-time signature scheme based on the Okamoto protocol [11] . It consists of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms ሺ‫݊݁ܩ‬ǡ ܵ݅݃݊ǡ ‫.‪ሻ‬ݕ݂݅ݎܸ݁‬ One-time signature scheme based on the Okamoto protocol:
• ‫݊݁ܩ‬ : The verification key ሺ‫݇‬ሻ and signing key ሺ‫݇ݏ‬ሻ are:
ݕ݂݅ݎܸ݁‬ The receiver verifies a message-signature pair ( ݉ , ߪ) by checking if the following equality holds:
This one-time signature scheme is secure because an adversary having seen at most one valid signature cannot efficiently compute a valid signature on a different message. Suppose that there exists an adversary that can compute a valid signature on a different message, given one valid signature, then the adversary has two different signatures ߪ and ߪǯ for the same ‫݇‬ ൌ ሺ݄ǡ ܽሻ . This implies that the adversary has two different conversations for the underlying -protocol ሺ݄ǡ ܽǡ ݉ǡ ߪሻ and ሺ݄ǡ ܽǡ ݉ǯǡ ߪǯሻ ‫݁ݐ݊‪ሺ‬‬ ݉ ് ݉ǯሻ . Therefore, from the special soundness property of the protocol the adversary can compute ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ. However this contradicts the witness hiding property of -protocols. Thus there exists no adversary that can efficiently compute a valid signature on a different message, given one valid signature. The above one-time signature scheme is therefore secure.
Since the above signature is a one-time signature it can only be used to sign one message with one key ሺ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ‫݇‬ሻ. Every new message must be signed with a new key to maintain security.
We propose to change the key by simply changing ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻ while keeping ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ unchanged. The signing key (or private key of the signer) for signing the E. Pseudorandom-permutation and Psuedorandomgenerator [2] As given by Ateniese ‫ݐ݁‬ ݈ܽ.
[2], we also make use of ʌ, a pseudo-random permutation (PRP) and f a pseudo-random function (PRF) that takes as input a security parameter ݇ with the following parameters:
We write ݂ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ to denote f keyed with key ݇ applied on input ‫.ݔ‬ The purpose of including the coefficients ܾ in the values for ߪ computed by the server as in [2] is to ensure that the server possesses each one of the requested blocks (see Section IV for details). These coefficients are determined by a PRF keyed with a fresh randomly-chosen key for each challenge to prevent the server from storing combinations (e.g., sums) of the original blocks instead of the original file blocks themselves.
IV. PROPOSED -PROVABLE DATA POSSESSION

A. -PDP Scheme Based on the Okamoto Protocol
The client ‫ܥ‬ wants to store a file ‫ܨ‬ , a finite ordered collection of ݊ blocks: ‫=ܨ‬ ሺ݉ ଵ ǡ ݉ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ ሻ on the server ܵ. We denote the output ‫ݕ‬ of an algorithm ‫ܤ‬ by ‫.ܤ‪ĸ‬ݕ‬
We first define a -provable data possession scheme that follows [2] and then present a security definition that demonstrates the data possession property. • ‫ͳ‪݁݊ሺ‬ܩݕ݁ܭ‬ ሻ ՜ ሺ‫݇‬ ǡ ‫݇ݏ‬ሻ is a probabilistic key generation algorithm that is run by the client to generate the public and private key to the scheme. It takes a security parameter ݇ as input, and returns a pair of public and secret keys ‫݇(‬ ǡ ‫)݇ݏ‬ for each file block ݉ .
• ܵ݅݃݊ሺ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݉ ሻ ՜ ߪ is an algorithm run by the client to generate the signature for each message block for ͳ ݅ ݊. It takes as inputs a secret key ‫݇ݏ‬ and a file block ݉ , and returns the signature ߪ ǡ .
• ‫݇‪ሺ‬ݎܸ݁‬ ǡ ݉ ǡ ߪ ǡ ሻ ՜ ሼǲ‫ݏݏ݁ܿܿݑݏ‬ǳǡ ǲ݂݈ܽ݅‫݁ݎݑ‬ǳሽ is run by the server to check the validity of the signature ߪ ǡ corresponding to message ݉ that it received from the server for ͳ ݅ ݊ . It takes a public key ‫݇‬ , signature ߪ ǡ and message block ݉ and returns ǲ ‫‪ǳ‬ݏݏ݁ܿܿݑݏ‬ if ߪ ǡ is a correct signature. Otherwise outputs ǲ݂݈ܽ݅‫݁ݎݑ‬ǳ.
• ‫‪ǡ‬ܨ‪݂ሺ‬ݎܲ݊݁ܩ‬ ݁ǡ )՜ ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻis an algorithm run by the server to generate a proof of possession. It takes as inputs an ordered collection of ‫,ܨ‬ a challenge ݁ from the client ‫ܥ‬ and which is an ordered collection of signatures corresponding to the blocks in ‫ܨ‬ sent by ‫.ܥ‬ It returns a proof of possession ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ for the blocks in ‫ܨ‬ that are determined by the challenge ݁.
• ‫‪݇ǡ‬‪݂ሺ‬ݎ݄ܲ݇ܿ݁ܥ‬ ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݁ǡ ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ ՜ ሼǲ‫ݏݏ݁ܿܿݑݏ‬ǳǡ ǲ݂݈ܽ݅‫݁ݎݑ‬ǳሽ is run by the client in order to validate a proof of possession. It takes as inputs a public key ‫݇‬ , a secret key ‫݇ݏ‬ , a challenge ݁ and proof of possession ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ. It outputs whether ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ is a correct proof of possession for the blocks given by ݄݈ܿܽ.
B. Proposed Scheme (-PDP)
We now construct a -PDP scheme in two phases, Setup and Challenge: Setup: The client ‫ܥ‬ runs ሺ‫݇‬ ǡ ‫݇ݏ‬ሻ ՚ ‫ͳ‪݁݊ሺ‬ܩݕ݁ܭ‬ ሻ, gives ‫݇‬ to ܵ and keeps ‫݇ݏ‬ secret. ‫ܥ‬ then runs ߪ ǡ ՚ ܵ݅݃݊ሺ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݉ ሻ for all ͳ ݅ ݊ and sends ‫݇‬ , ‫ܨ‬ ൌ ݉ ଵ ǡ ݉ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ and ൌ ሺߪ ଵǡ భ ǡ ߪ ଶǡ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ߪ ǡ ሻ to ܵ for storage. ܵ may run ሼǲ ‫‪ǳǡ‬ݏݏ݁ܿܿݑݏ‬ ǲ݂݈ܽ݅‫݁ݎݑ‬ǳሽ ՚ ‫݇‪ሺ‬ݎܸ݁‬ ǡ ݉ ǡ ߪ ǡ ሻ to check the validity of the signatures it received for ͳ ݅ ݊. ‫ܥ‬ may now delete ‫ܨ‬ and from its local storage. Challenge: ‫ܥ‬ requests proof of possession for ܿ distinct blocks of file ‫ܨ‬ (with ͳ ܿ ݊): 1. ‫ܥ‬ generates a random challenge ݁ and sends it to ܵ. 2. ܵ runs ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ ՚ ‫‪ǡ‬ܨ‪݂ሺ‬ݎܲ݊݁ܩ‬ ݁ǡ ሻ and sends ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ to ‫.ܥ‬ 3. ‫ܥ‬ runs ‫‪݇ǡ‬‪݂ሺ‬ݎ݄ܲ݇ܿ݁ܥ‬ ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݁ǡ ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻሻ to check if
(see Section IV-D for details) In the Setup phase, ‫ܥ‬ generates signatures for each file block and stores them along with the file at ܵ . In the Challenge phase, ‫ܥ‬ requests proof of possession for a challenge which is a subset of the blocks in ‫. ܨ‬ We use the data possession game (defined below) [2] to show security of the -PDP scheme. The Data Possession Game shows that an adversary cannot successfully construct a valid proof without possessing all blocks corresponding to a given challenge, unless it guesses all the missing blocks correctly.
C. Data Possession Game
• Setup: The challenger runs algorithm ‫ͳ‪݁݊ሺ‬ܩݕ݁ܭ‬ ሻ, to obtain ‫݇‬ and ‫݇ݏ‬ . It sends ‫݇‬ to the adversary and keeps ‫݇ݏ‬ secret.
• Query: The adversary adaptively selects some file block ݉ ଵ and sends it to the challenger. The challenger computes the verification signature ߪ ଵǡ భ ՚ ܵ݅݃݊ሺ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݉ ଵ ሻ and sends it back to the adversary. The adversary continues to query the challenger for the verification signatures ߪ ଶǡ మ ǡ ߪ ଷǡ య ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ߪ ǡ on the blocks of its choice ݉ ଶ ǡ ݉ ଷ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ . The challenger generates ߪ ǡ for ͳ ݅ ݊ , by computing ߪ ǡ ՚ ܵ݅݃݊ሺ‫݇‬ ǡ ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݉ ሻ. The adversary stores all the blocks as an ordered collection ‫ܨ‬ ൌ ሺ݉ ଵ ǡ ݉ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ ሻ along with the corresponding verification signatures ൌ ሺߪ ଵǡ భ ǡ ߪ ଶǡ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ߪ ǡ ሻ.
• Challenge: The challenger generates a challenge ݁ for the file blocks ݉ భ ǡ ݉ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ where ͳ ݅ ݊ǡ ͳ ݆ ܿ ǡ ͳ ܿ ݊ and requests the adversary to provide a proof of possession for these blocks determined by ݁.
• Forge: The adversary computes a pair of values as proof of possession ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ for the blocks indicated by ݄݈ܿܽ and returns ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ. If ‫݂ݎ݄ܲ݇ܿ݁ܥ‬ ሺ‫݇‬ǡ ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݁ǡ ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻሻ ൌ ‫‪ǳ‬ݏݏ݁ܿܿݑݏ‪ǲ‬‬ , then the adversary has won the Data Possession Game. DEFINITION 4.2 [2] . A -PDP system ሺSetup, Challengeሻ built on a PDP scheme ( ‫‪݁݊ǡ‬ܩݕ݁ܭ‬ ܵ݅݃݊ǡ ‫‪݂ǡ‬ݎܲ݊݁ܩ‬ ‫݂ݎ݄ܲ݇ܿ݁ܥ‬ ) guarantees data possession if for any (probabilistic polynomial-time) adversary A the probability that A wins the Data Possession Game on the set of file blocks is negligibly close to the probability that the challenger can extract those file blocks by means of a knowledge extractor K.
As given by Ateniese et al. [2] , in the security definition, the notion of a knowledge extractor is similar to the one introduced in the context of proof of knowledge [13] . If the adversary is able to win the Data Possession Game, then K can execute ‫݂ݎܲ݊݁ܩ‬ repeatedly until it extracts the selected blocks. On the other hand, if K cannot extract the blocks, then the adversary cannot win the game with more than negligible probability.
D. Details of the Proposed -PDP Scheme
We now give the details of the algorithms used in our scheme.
‫ܥ‬ chooses a value ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ such that ሺ݄ǡ ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻሻ ‫א‬ ܴ. ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ corresponds to the witness in the Okamoto protocol and is the client's secret chosen before the execution of the protocol. We propose the witness to remain unchanged throughout. Let ‫ܩ‬ be a group of prime order ‫ݍ‬ , with generators ݃ ଵ and ݃ ଶ , set in such a way that no one can efficiently compute ‫ݔ‬ , such that ݃ ଵ ൌ ݃ ଶ ௫ . Instead of choosing at random the secret parameters ሺሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଵ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଶ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଶ ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻ at random we use a pseudorandom function to generate them to sign the message blocks and later to verify the proof of possession. The client deletes these secret parameters from its storage and can generate them when needed. For ͳ ݅ ݊ , ‫ܥ‬ generates ሺሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଵ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଶ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଶ ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻ from a pseudorandom function ݂ ݇ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ݅ሻ and ݂ ݇ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ݅ ͳሻ . Given a secret key ݇ ௩ ,
As defined earlier, let f be a pseudo-random function and ʌ be a pseudo-random permutation.
• ‫ͳ‪݁݊ሺ‬ܩݕ݁ܭ‬ ሻ: is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm that generates the public key ‫݇‬ and secret key ‫݇ݏ‬ pairs ሺ‫݇‬ ǡ ‫݇ݏ‬ሻ such that ‫݇‬ ൌ ሺ݄ǡ ܽ ሻ ൌ ሺ݃ ଵ ௪ భ ݃ ଶ ௪ మ ǡ ݃ ଵ ௩ భ ݃ ଶ ௩ మ ሻ for each ݉ for all ͳ ݅ ݊ and ‫݇ݏ‬ ൌ ሺሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻǡ ሺሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଵ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଶ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଶ ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻሻ. It takes a security parameter ݇, generators ݃ ଵ and ݃ ଶ , witness ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ as input, and returns a pair of public and secret key ሺ‫݇‬ ǡ ‫݇ݏ‬ሻ. The public key (also the verification key) is ‫݇‬ ൌ ሺ݃ ଵ ௪ భ ݃ ଶ ௪ మ ǡ ݃ ଵ ௩ భ ݃ ଶ ௩ మ ሻ ൌ ሺ݄ǡ ܽ ሻǤ The public key on each message ݉ is given to the server. This is done at the beginning of the protocol. Private Input: For ͳ ݅ ݊, ‫ܥ‬ generates ሺሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଵ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଶ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଶ ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻ in the following manner:
ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻ ൌ ሺ݂ ݇ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ݅ሻǡ ݂ ݇ ‫ݒ‬ ሺ݅ ͳሻሻ and sets the secret key
These public keys are used as verification keys to check the validity of the signatures that the server receives from the client on the corresponding messages.
• ܵ݅݃݊ሺ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݉ ሻ : It computes signature ߪ ǡ on the file block ݉ for all ͳ ݅ ݊. The signatures are computed in the following manner:
• ‫݇‪ሺ‬ݎܸ݁‬ ǡ ݉ ǡ ߪ ǡ ሻ : is an algorithm that checks the validity of the signature ߪ ǡ corresponding to message ݉ that it received from the server for ͳ ݅ ݊. It takes a public key ‫݇‬ , signature ߪ ǡ and message block ݉ and checks if ߪ ǡ is a valid signature on ݉ . The client computes the signature of the ݅ ௧ message ݉ as ߪ ǡ ൌ ሺ‫ݖ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݖ‬ ଶ ሻ ൌ ሺ݉ ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ‫݀݉‬ ‫ݍ‬ǡ ݉ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ‫݀݉‬ ‫ݍ‬ሻ and sends ሺ݉ ǡ ߪ ǡ ሻ to all receivers. On receiving ሺ݉ ǡ ߪ ǡ ሻ , the server performs verification by checking if the following equality is satisfied:
The server receives ݃ ଵ , ݃ ଶ , and ݄ in the beginning. To verify the message-signature pair, ሺ݉ ǡ ߪ ǡ ൌ ሺ‫ݖ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݖ‬ ଶ ሻሻ , the server should know the values ݃ ଵ , ݃ ଶ , ݄, and ܽ . ‫ܥ‬ computes ݊ public keys (also verification keys) and sends them to ܵ so the server knows ܽ in the beginning. It returns ǲ ‫‪ǳ‬ݏݏ݁ܿܿݑݏ‬ if ߪ ǡ is a correct signature on ݉ . Otherwise outputs ǲ݂݈ܽ݅‫݁ݎݑ‬ǳǤ
݄݈ܿܽ is chosen in the following manner. For 1 ݆ ܿ, it computes the indices, ݅ of the blocks and co-efficients, ܾ for which the proof is generated.
is the ݅ -th value in ሻ. 3. Output proof ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ.
• ‫‪݇ǡ‬‪݂ሺ‬ݎ݄ܲ݇ܿ݁ܥ‬ ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݁ǡ ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻሻ:
and secret key ‫݇ݏ‬ ՚ ሺሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻǡ ሺሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଵ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଶ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଶ ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻሻ . For ͳ ݆ ܿ, compute the indices, ݅ of the blocks and coefficients, ܾ for which the proof is generated.
݅ ൌ ߨ ݇ ͳ ሺ݆ሻ ܾ ൌ ݂ ݇ ʹ ሺ݆ሻ 3. Given ሺ‫݇‬ǡ ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ and
If the protocol that -PDP is based on is an Okamoto protocol then -PDP guarantees data possession.
Proof: Under the Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption of Okamoto protocols, we prove that -PDP guarantees data possession. We assume that a group ‫ܩ‬ with prime order ‫ݍ‬ is known. Furthermore, two generators ݃ ଵ and ݃ ଶ of ‫ܩ‬ are known. These values have been set up in such a way that nobody knows ‫݈݃‬ మ ݃ ଵ , i.e., we assume that no one can efficiently compute ‫ݔ‬ such that ݃ ଵ ൌ ݃ ଶ ௫ . This is the DL assumption. We assume there exists an adversary ࣜ that wins the Data Possession Game on a challenge picked by ࣛ and show that ࣛ will be able to extract the file blocks determined by the challenge. If ࣜ wins the data possession game of the -PDP scheme by sending a valid proof that contains a message that is not same as the correct message, then we show how to construct an adversary ࣛ that uses ࣜ in order to find ‫ݔ‬ such that ݃ ଵ ൌ ݃ ଶ ௫ . This violates the DL assumption. Therefore, ࣜ must generate a proof that contains a message identical to the correct message. A knowledge extractor K is then constructed which can extract the file blocks involved in the proof. ࣛ will play the role of the challenger in the Data Possession Game and will interact with ࣜ.
ࣛ simulates a -PDP environment for ࣜ as follows:
Setup:
ࣛ chooses ݃ ଵ ǡ ݃ ଶ ‫א‬ ‫ܩ‬ . The secret key values ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ are chosen at random from the group ܼ and ሺሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଵ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଶ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଶ ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻ are generated by a PRF with a secret key ݇ ௩ . The witnesses ሺ‫ݓ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݓ‬ ଶ ሻ remain constant throughout the execution of the protocol and are hence chosen before the start of the protocol. The parameters ሺሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଵ ሻǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵଶ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶଶ ሻǡ ǥ ǡ ሺ‫ݒ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݒ‬ ଶ ሻሻ are chosen at the beginning of the protocol.
It sends ‫݇‬ to ࣜ and keeps ‫݇ݏ‬ secret. (see Section IV-D for details on checking the validity of the signatures at the server on knowing the public key)
Query:
ࣜ makes signing queries adaptively: ࣜ selects a block ݉ ଵ and index ݅ ଵ . ࣜ sends ݉ ଵ and ݅ ଵ to ࣛ , ࣛ generates ߪ భ ǡ భ at random and sends it back to ࣜ. ࣜ continues to query ࣛ for the signatures ߪ మ ǡ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ߪ ǡ on the blocks ݉ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ . The restriction is that ࣜ cannot make tagging queries for two different blocks using the same index. ࣛ answers ࣜ's signing oracle queries as follows:
-when ࣛ receives a signing query for a block ݉ and index ݅, with ͳ ݅ ݊: • if a previous tagging query has been made for the same ݉ and ݅ , then ࣛ retrieves the recorded tuple ሺ݉ǡ ݅ǡ ሺ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻሻ and returns ߪ ǡ ൌ ሺ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻ.
• else, ࣛ picks ሺ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻ ோ ՚ ܼ , records the tuple ሺ݉ǡ ݅ǡ ሺ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻሻ and returns the signature ߪ ǡ ൌ ሺ‫ݎ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݎ‬ ଶ ሻ.
Challenge:
ࣛ generates the challenge ݁ ൌ ሺሺ݅ ଵ ǡ ݅ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݅ ሻǡ ሺܾ ଵ ǡ ܾ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܾ ሻሻ, where ݅ ଵ ǡ ݅ ଶ ǡ Ǥ ǤǤ ǡ ݅ are the indices of the blocks and ሺܾ ଵ ǡ ܾ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܾ ሻ are corresponding co-efficients of the blocks for which ࣛ requests proof of possession ሺwith ͳ ݅ ݊ǡ ͳ ݆ ܿǡ ͳ ܿ ݊ and ܾ is chosen at random from ܼ ሻ. ࣛ sends ݁ to ࣜ and requests a proof of possession for this challenge.
Forge:
ࣜ generates a proof ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ on the blocks ݉ భ ǡ ݉ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ . Note that ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ is a valid proof if it passes ‫‪݇ǡ‬‪݂ሺ‬ݎ݄ܲ݇ܿ݁ܥ‬ ‫݇ݏ‬ǡ ݁ǡ ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ . ࣜ returns ሺ‫ܯ‬ǡ ሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ሻሻ to ࣛ and ࣛ checks the validity of this proof.
Let the correct proof be ሺ‫ܯ‬ǯሺ‫ݏ‬ ଵ ǯǡ ‫ݏ‬ ଶ ǯሻሻ where ‫ܯ‬ǯ ൌ ܾ ଵ ݉ భ ܾ ଶ ݉ మ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ܾ ݉ . ࣛ knows this because it knows ‫݇‬ and ‫.݇ݏ‬ If ࣜ sent a valid proof such that ‫ܯ‬ǯ ് ‫,ܯ‬ then ࣛ knows two sets of values that satisfy the verifiability condition:
On dividing (1) by (2),
Therefore, a ‫ݔ‬ such that ݃ ଵ ൌ ݃ ଶ ௫ can be computed using the above as follows:
This violates the DL-assumption. Therefore, ࣜ's proof is such that ‫ܯ‬ǯ ൌ ‫.ܯ‬ Hence ࣛ is successfully able to extract the correct message ‫ܯ‬ǯ.
At the end of the simulation ࣛ will be able to extract ‫ܯ‬ǯ ൌ ܾ ଵ ݉ భ ܾ ଶ ݉ మ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ܾ ݉ . We now show that our protocol constitutes a proof of knowledge of the blocks
We show that a knowledge extractor K may extract the file blocks ݉ భ ǡ ݉ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ . Note that each time K runs the -PDP protocol, he obtains a linear equation of the form ‫ܯ‬ǯ ൌ ܾ ଵ ݉ భ ܾ ଶ ݉ మ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ܾ ݉ . By choosing independent coefficients ܾ ଵ ǡ ܾ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܾ in ܿ executions of the protocol on the same blocks ݉ ଵ ǡ ݉ ଶ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ , K obtains ܿ independent linear equations in the variables ݉ భ ǡ ݉ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ , K may now solve these equations to obtain the file blocks ݉ భ ǡ ݉ మ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݉ . This shows that our proof is a proof of knowledge.
V. COMPLEXITY
A. Parameters
The definition of performance parameters of -PDP follows the parameters from [2] . They include:
• Computation complexity: The computational cost to pre-process a file ሺ at ‫ܥ‬ሻ , to generate a proof of possession ሺat ܵሻ and to verify such a proof ሺat ‫ܥ‬ሻ; • Block access complexity: The number of file blocks accessed to generate a proof of possession (at ܵ); • Communication complexity: The amount of data transferred ሺbetween ‫ܥ‬ and ܵሻǤ We follow the specifications for a scalable solution given by Ateniese et al. [2] where the block access and hence the computation at the server should be minimized, because the server may be involved in concurrent interactions with many clients. In addition to this, we also minimize computation at the client. We minimize bandwidth by making our PDP scheme check for proof of data possession without retrieving entire file blocks. A deterministic guarantee of possession can be given by when the client asks for proof for all the file blocks. But we give a probabilistic guarantee of possession wherein we let our scheme access a random subset of the file blocks from the server's storage to compute the proof. Table  I shows the computation details of the proposed scheme in comparison with S-PDP given by [2] . All exponentiations and multiplications listed in the table are modular operations. When the client asks the server for a proof for a challenge with ܿ=460 randomly selected blocks out of a file ݊=1,000,000 blocks, the S-PDP scheme requires the server to perform 461 exponentiations, 919 multiplications and 459 additions while the -PDP needs only 1380 multiplications and 1377 additions. We eliminate any exponentiation in our scheme. To check the proof at the client, S-PDP needs to perform 462 exponentiations, 461 hashes, 460 inverses and 460 additions while -PDP uses only 5 exponentiations, 923 multiplications and 918 additions. Note that an exponentiation ݃ ௫ , where ‫ݔ‬ is ݈ -bit value, requires ଷ multiplications( ݈ is usually 1024 bits). The number of exponentiations in -PDP remain to be 5 irrespective of the size of ܿ . This shows the small number of fixed exponentiations that is involved in -PDP which shows the improvements over the number of exponentiations that are linear in the number of challenges in S-PDP. The proposed scheme is more efficient as compared to that in [2] since we minimize the client and server computations and have very few exponentiations, multiplications and additions while the S-PDP scheme proposed by Ateniese ‫ݐ݁‬ ݈ܽ. [2] needs exponentiations, hash operations along with multiplication and addition operations which is expensive. We eliminate any such computation at both the client and the server.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced a scheme for -Provable Data Possession, in which we minimize client and server computation, file block access complexity, and client-server communication complexity by a major reduction in the number of exponentiations involved in the proof of possession. Our solution minimizes the storage at both client and server. We completely eliminate exponentiation which can be expensive at the server to generate proof of possession. We instead perform simple modular multiplications and additions at the server. We allow the client to verify data possession with a minimum of 5 exponents irrespective of the size of the challenge while the previous solution requires a minimum of ܿ exponentiations.
